This paper generalises the approach taken by Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) and Simon (1989) and provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in games with continuous strategy spaces and discontinuous payo¤ functions. The conditions can be applied widely, and examples for existence of pure strategy and monotonic equilibria in First-Price auctions are provided. The conditions are also appropriate for ensuring that computer generated equilibrium solutions can be extended to continuous strategy spaces.
A Note on the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with
Discontinuous Payo¤s J. Rupert J. Gatti 1 The seminal paper on the existence of Nash equilibria in games with discontinuous payo¤ functions is Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) . In that paper Dasgupta & Maskin weaken the assumption of continuous payo¤ functions made in the classical existence theorems (e.g. Debreu (1952)) and generate existence results for mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a family of games possessing a very speci…c form of discontinuity in their payo¤s. Simon (1987) and Reny (1999) generalize their results to a broader set of games, while Reny allows for the analysis of pure strategy, as well as mixed strategy, Nash equilibria. This paper strictly The general approach taken by Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) to the problem of determining conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in games with compact strategy spaces and discontinuous payo¤s is to consider a sequence of consecutively …ner …nite approximations of the strategy space, converging to the compact space at the limit. Mixed strategy Nash equilibria exist for games with …nite strategy spaces (Nash 1951 ), so conditions are derived which ensure that the limit of a sequence of '…nite game' Nash equilibria is itself a Nash equilibrium of the limit game. As the limit of any sequence of '…nite game'Nash equilibria will be non-empty, and there exist games without Nash equilibria (Sion & Wolfe (1957) ), it must be the case that additional restrictions on the game are required.
Dasgupta & Maskin consider games where the points of discontinuities in each player's payo¤ function can be represented by a …nite number of continuous and one-to-one functions of the strategies of other players. The main result of their paper (1986a, Theorem 5, p.14) identi…es additional conditions on the agents'payo¤ functions which ensure that the limit of any sequence of '…nite game'Nash equilibria is a Nash equilibrium of the limit game.
Simon explains that these conditions are stronger than is necessary.
If a particular sequence of …nite approximations of the strategy space is referred to as a '…nite test sequence', then for any …nite test sequence we may consider a 'limit set'of mixed strategies which are the limit of a sequence of (mixed strategy) Nash equilibria in games along the test sequence. The conditions identi…ed by Dasgupta & Maskin e¤ectively ensure that every element of every limit set for every …nite test sequence is a Nash equilibrium of the limit game. Simon (1987, Lemma, p.575) derives conditions which ensure that every element of the limit set for a particular …nite test sequence is a Nash equilibrium of the limit game. He then goes on to identify conditions on the payo¤ functions of agents which are su¢ cient to satisfy the conditions in his lemma .
The increased generality of these results is that the conditions need not hold true for every test sequence, but only for one.
Reny (1999) takes a di¤erent approach to that of Dasgupta & Maskin and Simon, considering a sequence of approximations of the payo¤ function rather than of the strategy space. He obtains conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium in the limit game if Nash exist for each approximation game, and shows that these conditions are strictly more general than those obtained by Simon. Moreover Reny's results are applicable to pure as well as mixed strategy games.
However, even conceptually, it is clear that Simon's conditions are stronger than required for existence. Considering just one …nite test sequence, it is not necessary that every element of the limit set be a Nash equilibrium of the limit game but just that there exists an element where this is true. Furthermore we need not restrict the test sequence to include only …nite strategy spaces. The main result in this paper (Theorem 1) provides su¢ cient conditions for an element of a limit set to be a Nash equilibrium of the limit game, and does not restrict the test sequence to be …nite. Furthermore it is shown that an acceptable test sequence satisfying the conditions exists for any Nash equilibrium of the limit game.
The characteristic feature of Theorem 1 is that it requires the identi…cation of a speci…c test sequence and a speci…c element of the limit set. Thus, for example, it is particularly applicable for testing the generality of equilibria obtained by computer simulation (with necessarily …nite strategy spaces) to games with continuous strategy spaces. For theoretical work however, where conditions on the primitives of the model are probably more applicable, this requirement may appear overly restrictive. However Theorem 1 can be applied in tandem with any primitives based existence theorem to extend the existence result to a wider class of games. Theorem 1, in combination with any condition su¢ cient for the creation of an acceptable test sequence, will ensure the existence of equilibria in the limit game and existence results generated using alternative approaches, see for example Baye et al (1993) and Tian (1992) , can be applied if desired.
This feature is highlighted in the application.
In the following section the primary notation and de…nitions are introduced and the main result of the paper stated. An application of this result to First-Price auctions is provided in Section 2, while Section 3 concludes.
1 The Existence Result.
Consider a game G = (S; U ), where S =X i2I S i , I is the …nite set of all agents, S i is a compact metric space of strategies for agent i 2 I , U =X i2I U i and U i : S ! R is the utility function for agent i. I assume that the utility function is bounded and Borel measurable. Let N (G) denote the set of (pure strategy) Nash Equilibria of the game G,
we are interested in obtaining conditions that will ensure that N (G) is non-empty. To do this we consider a sequence of games all possessing Nash equilibria and converging to the game G.
Let F (S i ) be the set of closed, non-empty subsets of S i and F (S) = X i2I F (S i ). Paired with the Hausdor¤ metric, d H , F (S) is a compact metric space (Hildenbrand 1974, p17 ). 2 De…ne a Test Sequence for S; : N ! F (S); to be a mapping from the Natural numbers into F (S); so (n) S; and lim n !1 d H ( (n); S) = 0: We may consider a test sequence for S as a sequence of progressively …ner approximations of S, converging to the compact metric space S in the limit, but notice that the test sequence need not be …nite. A test sequence, combined with the utility function U , can be used to generate a sequence of games G n = ( (n); U ) which converges to the limit game G; and a corresponding sequence N n 2 F ( (n)) [ ? where
is the set of all (pure strategy) Nash Equilibria of the 2 "For every two non-empty subsets E and F of the metric space (X; d) one de…nes the Hausdor¤ distance d
H (E; F ) (with respect to the metric d on X ) by
where B " (E) denotes the "-neighbourhood of E." (Hildenbrand, p.16) Game G n :
Assigning the topology of weak convergence, every (non-empty) sequence in compact metric space S possesses a convergent subsequence (Hidenbrand, p49). Without loss of generality we consider only convergent sub-sequences, and will call a test sequence acceptable when, for all n, N n is non-empty and
The existence of such a sequence is not guaranteed, but Theorem 1 identi…es conditions which ensure that there exists an element s 2 N such that s 2 N (G) when an acceptable sequence has been identi…ed. In fact Theorem 1 provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium, thus we also know that for any Nash equilibrium of the limit game there exists at least one acceptable sequence satisfying the conditions.
Before stating Theorem 1 two further de…nitions are required, both of which are direct extensions of concepts developed by Simon and Reny.
Consider a test sequence and a convergent sequence of strategies (s n ) n2N where s n 2 (n); lim n!1 s n = s 2 S and lim n!1 U i (s n ) is de…ned for all agents i 2 I. 3
De…nition 1 We will say that the utility function U has the complementary discontinuity property (cdp) for the sequence (s n ) n2N if, for any agent i 2 I where
The complementary discontinuity property ensures that, if an agents expected payo¤ decreases discontinuously along the sequence (s n ) n2N
at s then there exists another agent who experiences a discontinuous increase in utility. Notice that, in contrast to Simon and Reny, this property does NOT need to hold for every sequence -but is de…ned for 3 As S is compact and U i is bounded every test sequence will posses a sub-sequence with these properties, without loss of generality we consider only these sub-sequences. the speci…c sequence (s n ) n2N : 4 Let Z n i : i (n) ! R be the best response value function for agent i , where
The best response value function represents the highest level of utility agent i can obtain in the game G n given the strategies played by all other agents. Clearly, from the de…nition of Nash Equilibrium, s n 2 N n if and only if, for all agents i 2 I;
De…nition 2 We will say that the Utility function is payo¤ secure (ps) for the sequence (s n ) n2N if, for all agents i 2 I and all > 0 there exists n < 1 such that for all n n;
Payo¤ security ensures that, along the sequence (s n ) n2N , every agent can obtain a payo¤ against opponents' strategies su¢ ciently close to s i which is almost as good as the best payo¤ obtainable by the agent in the limit game against s i : Once again, the generalization of this condition over similar conditions de…ned by Simon and Reny is that payo¤ security is de…ned for a speci…c sequence and need not hold for all possible sequences. Having introduced this terminology, the main existence theorem can now be stated.
Theorem 1 Existence Theorem.
A vector of strategies s 2 S will constitute a Nash equilibrium of the game G = (S; U ) if and only if there exists an acceptable test sequence and a sequence of strategies (s n ) n2N , where s n N n and lim n!1 s n = s , such that the utility function U a. possesses the complementary discontinuity property for the sequence (s n ) n2N and b. is payo¤ secure for the sequence (s n ) n2N :
Proof. a. Su¢ ciency
The proof is by contradiction.
Assume that s = 2 N (G), so there exists an agent i 2 I , i > 0 and
As the sequence is acceptable and U is payo¤ secure along the sequence we have that
As U possess the complementary discontinuity property along the sequence, there exists another agent j 2 I and j > 0 such that
Payo¤ security ensures that there exists n < 1 such that for all n n there exists t n j 2 S n i where
Thus, for n su¢ ciently high,
The proof is by construction, we show that for any s 2 N (G) it is possible to construct a (…nite) acceptable sequence, along which the conditions hold.
Speci…cally we make use of the fact that if s 2 S 0 S and
Consider the …nite strategy space where for all i 2 I; S 1 i = fs i g: Along any sequence such that The result is also applicable in speci…c games where more restrictive 'general' properties over the primitives of the game fail. Examples of the former can be easily constructed -being any game where (for example) the 'misbehaviour'of the payo¤s can be shown to occur at an irrelevant part of the payo¤ function.
However Theorem 1 can also be applied in less speci…c settings to provide existence results which are based on the primitives of the game.
For example, Corollary 1 provides general conditions on the payo¤ function which ensure existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game G = (S; U ) whenever a acceptable test sequence can be established.
Following Reny (1999), for all s 2 S let U (s) = (U 1 (s); : : : U I (s)):
The graph of the vector payo¤ function is the subset of SxR I given by f(s; u) 2 SxR I j u = U (s)g: We will say that: a. player i can secure a payo¤ 2 R at s 2 S if there exists an 
Proof.
If the utility function is cdp and ps everywhere then it is cdp and ps for any acceptable test sequence. Thus the result follows directly from Theorem 1. QED.
Reny (1999, Theorem 3.1) provides an existence theorem with similar features. The di¤erence between Corollary 1 and Reny's result is that this Corollary requires only the existence of an acceptable test sequence (a weaker condition than quasi concavity of the game) while Reny requires better-reply security (a weaker condition than cdp and ps).
Extending Theorem 1 and Corrolary 1 to allow for mixed strategy equilibrium is straight forward, requiring only the extension of de…ni-tions to the new setting. Of course the advantage of considering mixed strategies in this setting is that, applying Nash's theorem, every game with …nite strategy spaces possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Thus any test sequence , where (n) is …nite for all n possesses an acceptable subsequence in mixed strategies.
Let (M (S); ) denote the mixed strategy extension of the limit game G = (S; U ), and (M ( (n)); ) denote the mixed strategy extension of
is the set of probability measures de…ned on the Borel subsets of X i , and
For every mixed strategy (n) 2 M ( (n)) there exists an obvious extension n 2 M (S); thus the any sequence of strategies ( (n)) n2N
can be written as a sequence ( n ) n2N . As, by assumption, S is compact and U is bounded and Borel measurable, the set M (S) paired with the Prohorov metric, , is a compact metric space and i is bounded.
It follows directly that Theorem 1 can be applied to the mixed strat- In this section we propose an alternative second round 'tie breaking' auction, speci…cally a cheap-talk high bid auction where bidders submit costless messages drawn from an ordered and …nite message space. We show that, when the set of bidders and types are …nite, this second round auction will support a pure strategy equilibrium under any conditions su¢ cient for equilibrium in …nite strategy spaces (in fact the main result is more general than this). Furthermore equilibrium properties such as monotonicity that exist in the …nite auctions will survive in the continuous strategy equilibrium. Thus for …nite type spaces this result is a direct generalisation of Maskin & Riley and, for example, allows us to directly extend any existence and monotonicity results generated in …nite strategy spaces to continuous strategy spaces. 6 To prove these assertions requires the introduction of further nota- 6 Extending the results to continuous type space is objective of present research.
tion. Consider a 'standard'…nite type high bid auction, A = (B; u i ; T i ) i2I , where :
i. There is a …nite set (I) of potential bidders for a single, indivisible, product.
ii. Each player i 2 I has a type t i 2 T i , where T i is a …nite set, which is known to the player but unobserved other players. 7 Let f (t 1 ; :::; t I ) denote the probability of (t 1 ; :::; t I ) 2 X i2I T i ; and de…ne the conditional
f (t i ; t 0 i ) Assume further that, for all i 2 I and all t i 2 T i , there exists
iii. Each player selects whether or not to participate in the auction, The standard high bid auction awards the product to the participating bidder submitting the highest 'bid', or randomly amongst those 7 Standard abuse of notation allows us to write i 2 I = f1; :::; Ig: For notational ease we restrict the set of types, T , and the space of bids,B, to be the same for all bidders -but the results can easily be extended to allow the type and strategy spaces to be type dependent. 8 Following standard notation, let x i denote the vector x without the ith component. 9 The bounds on the set of bids could be justi…ed by assuming either that the buyer and seller are wealth constrained, or by assuming that there exists a minimum (reservation) bid the seller will accept and a bid so high as to guarantee negative utility if successful. For simplicity we assume that the nonparticipation decision is represented by the bid b i = ?; and that the product auctioned will only ever be assigned to a participating bidder. bidders submitting the highest bid if more than one does so. Notice that the payo¤ functions from winning remain quite general, and may di¤er between bidders. It is NOT necessary that all winning bidders 'pay' their bid in full -thus this general speci…cation allows the auctioneer to 'favour'one player over another when awarding the commodity.
We wish to augment the standard high-bid auction by introducing a second round 'cheap talk'high bid auction. Speci…cally we introduce a …nite and ordered message space, = f0; :::; M g: Bidders who tie for the highest bid in the …rst round submit a costless message, i 2 ; and the auction winner is then selected randomly from amongst those who have submitted the highest message. We denote this 'cheap talk' message augmented auction by b A = ((B; ); u i ; T i ) i2I ; and the set of Nash equilibrium in this auction N ( b A): As before, we will consider a sequence of approximations of the bid space B n converging to B; so lim n!1 d H (B n ; B) = 0; and the corresponding sequence of auctions
The main result is now stated in Theorem 2, with the proof contained in the Appendix. 
Furthermore, if there exists a sequence s n 2 N (A n ) such that lim n!1 s n = s and s n is (strictly) monotonic for all n su¢ ciently large, then so to is the equilibrium b
Once again, the application of Theorem 2 that all three will necessarily have equilibria when the cheap talk high bid message tie breaking rule is imposed -which they show is not the case for the Vickery auction tie breaking rule they proposed. 10 3 Conclusion.
In this paper we develop necessary su¢ cient conditions for the existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash equilibrium in games with discontinuous payo¤s and continuous strategy spaces. The approach is a direct generalization of the existence results developed by Dasgupta & Maskin (1986) and Simon (1989) , and the conditions identi…ed di¤er from the su¢ cient conditions developed by Reny (1999) . These di¤erences are explained, and the result used to provide alternative proofs to some general existence results …rst presented by Reny. The main theorem (Theorem 1) identi…es properties for the limit of a sequence of solutions to approximating games to be an equilibrium in the limit game.
The properties identi…ed are reasonably transparent and are particularly appropriate for testing computer generated solutions to speci…c games, where …nite approximations of continuous strategy spaces are a technical necessity. In an application the main theorem is applied to First-Price Auctions, where a speci…c 'cheap talk'tie breaking rule is proposed -with ties in the highest bid being broken by a second round, costless, High-Bid message auction. It is shown that implementing this tie breaking rule will ensure existence and (strict) monotonicity of Nash equilibria in continuous First-Price auctions whenever these properties exist in …nite First-Price auctions.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.
By de…nition, for every s 2 N = lim n!1 N (A n ) there exists a convergent subsequence s n 2 N (A n ) such that lim n!1 s n = s : The proof proceeds by showing that for every such subsequence s n it is possible to construct a sequence of (costly) message augmented auctions ( c A n ) which converges to the costless message augmented auction b A;
and an associated sequence of Nash equilibria b
and that the Nash equilibria b s and s are related in the manner described in the Theorem.
We show (Lemma 3) that for any sequence s n 2 N (A n ) there exists a sequence of …nite high price auctions A n such that s n 2 N (A n ) and
We obtain conditions (Lemma 1) that enable a …nite high bid auction to be represented by a strategically equivalent …nite message-augmented auction. We then (Lemma 2) apply Theorem 1 to identify conditions which ensure that the limit of a sequence of equilibria of the …nite message-augmented auctions is an equilibrium of the limiting message-augmented auction. We then show by construction (Lemma 3) that the limit of any sequence of Nash equilibria in high bid auctions can also be obtained as the …rst round bid component of the limit of a sequence of Nash equilibria in …nite message-augmented auctions that satisfy the conditions identi…ed in Lemma 2. Thus, as required, the limit of this sequence constitutes an equilibrium of the continuous-bid message augmented auction. Finally, we show that messages are costless in the limiting auction, and that the monotonicity property survives in the limit.
Some initial notation is required.
Let X be a …nite and ordered set. Without loss of generality, let X = fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x #X g where x 1 < x 2 < ::: < x #X :
For any x 2 X let R(x; X) : X ! N denote the relative ranking of x within X and let R 1 (i; X) : N ! X be the inverse mapping. Thus R(x i ; X) = i and R 1 (i; X) = x i :
De…ne a mapping : X Z + ! X such that for any x 2 X and any non-negative integer z 2 Z + ; (x; z) = fy 2 XjR(y; X) = minfR(x; X) + z; #Xg: Thus (x; z) gives the element of X which is ranked z higher than x or, if no such element exists, the largest element in the set X:
Lemma 5 A …nite …rst price auction A n = ((B n ; u i ; T i ) i2I can be represented by a strategically equivalent …nite 'message-augmented'high bid auction c A n = (( c B n ; ); v i ; T i ) i2I ; where = f0; 1; :::; M g and
if there exists c B n B n such that the mapping : c B n ! B n is one-to-one and onto.
Furthermore, if auctions A n and c A n are strategically equivalent, then for any s n 2 N (A n ) there exists b s n 2 N c A n if and only if for all i 2 I
Proof:
If the mapping : c B n ! B n is 1-1 and onto then the two spaces map into each other uniquely and, given the utility function, the two auctions are identical providing they determine the winner identically.
This requires that for all ; 0 2 ; (x; ) < (y; 0 ) if x < y, and that (x; ) < (x; 0 ) if and only if < 0 : These properties follow directly from the requirement that : c B n ! B n is 1-1 and onto -and so (x; M ) < (y; 1) if and only if x < y:QED:
It may be worth noting that, as de…ned, the messages are not costless when the bid space is …nite. However, as the distance between consecutive bids converges to zero, so too does the cost of any message.
As in Theorem 1, we now consider a sequence of …nite bid spaces (B n ) where for all n; b s n 2 N ( c A n ), and
The proof is a direct application of Theorem 1. First we show that the conditions identi…ed ensure that the payo¤ function possesses the complementary discontinuity property along the sequence, and then that the payo¤ function is also payo¤ secure along the sequence.
A players expected payo¤ in the auction can be written as
where ;
As
is a subset of a …nite space the limit of this sequence is well de…ned and there exists a subsequence such
Discontinuity of this sequence in the limit requires that
As the message space is …nite we know that there exists a subsequence such that, for all i 2 I and t i 2 T i ,
b. Payo¤ security. ; and all > 0; lim n!1 Z n t i ( c
For any X B and s i 2 X t j ;j6 =i (X; ); let (s i ) = fx 2 Xjthere exists j 2 Ini and t j 2 T j such that s j (t j ) = (x; j (t j ))g denote the set of bids that may be realised by players other than i; given s i :
Suppose that z 2 B and m 2 are best responses for agent i 2 I
We consider separately the case where z 2 ( c s i ) and z = 2 ( c s i ):
; then there exists a sequence z n 2 ( c s n i ) where lim n!1 z n = z and there exists n < 1 such that for all n > n 
As y 2 ( c s i ) we can now apply part 
Proof:
The proof makes use of the fact that one can systematically remove unused strategies from players without disrupting Nash equilibrium.
More formally, consider a game G = (S; U ) and a Nash equilibrium
The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step 1
Consider the sequence of …nite auctions (A n ) n2N converging to A and any sequence of Nash equilibrium strategies (s n ) n2N converging to s: For every b 2 (s) there exists a non-empty subset of players whose equilibrium strategies converge to b, that is for which lim n!1 s n i (t i ) = b: Consider the set B n (b) = fx 2 B n j there exists (i; t i ) such that lim n!1 s n i (t i ) = b and s n i (t i ) = xg: As the sets of agents and types are …nite there are at most T = P i2I T i elements in B n (b): Let b n (resp: b n ) denote the min (max) values of B n (b); and consider the set We can now repeat this deletion procedure for every b 2 (s); to obtain B n = B n nf S b2 (s) [b n ; b n ]g [ f S b2 (s) B n (b)g: By de…nition s n 2 N (A n ) along the sequence (s n ) n2N converging to s: By construction s n 2 B n B n and lim n!1 B n = B: Thus, for the high bid auction A n = (B n ; u i ; T i ) i2I we have that s n 2 N (A n ) and the sequence of auctions A n is acceptable and converges to A:
Step 2.
Consider now a set c B n B n such that i. R 1 (1; c B n ) = R 1 (1; B n ), so the lowest element of both sets is the same ii. for every b 2 (s); b n 2 c B n ; so the lowest element of every set of sequences converging to b is an element
iii. For any x; y 2 c B n such that R(y; c B n ) = R(x; c B n ) + 1; we have that M < R(y; B n ) R(x; B n ) < 2M + 1 and, furthermore, R(y; B n ) R(x; B n ) = M + 1 if y 6 = b n for some b 2 (s): Thus c B n takes every (M + 1)th element of B n ; with the proviso that the lowest element de…ned in (ii) are elements and no two elements have a rank di¤erence of less than M + 1 in B n :
Now, consider the space f B n B n de…ned by the set c B n and the mapping : B n ! B n ; so that x 2 f B n if and only if there exist y 2 c B n and 2 such that (y; ) = x. By construction, for all n; s n 2 f B n thus s n 2 f A n = ( f B n ; u i ; T i ) i2I
d H ( f B n ; B) (2M + 1)d H (B n ; B); so the sequence f B n converges to B; and the sequence f A n converges to A and is acceptable the mapping is one to one and onto
Step 3 We can now apply Lemma 1, to show that the sequence of message augmented auctions c A n = (( c B n ; ); v i ; T i ) i2I are strategically equivalent to the acceptable sequence of auctions f A n = ( f B n ; u i ; T i ) i2I :
By the construction of c B n ; for all b 2 (s) and all (b n i (t i ); monotonic then the corresponding strategies in the message augmented auctions must also be monotonic and either assign higher bids, or higher message. As neither bids nor messages converge in the limit -the limiting strategies must also preserve monotonicity. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
